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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
PA TRICIA M. BURNHAM,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,
vs.
BANKERS LIFE &
CASUALTY COMPANY,
an Illinois corporation,
Defendant and
Respondent.

Case No.
11924

RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING
AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF
PETITION FOR REHEARING
Defendant and respondent, Bankers Lile & Casualty Company, respectfully petitions the court to
grant a rehearing of the above captioned matter upon
the following grounds and reasons:
POINT I
It cannot be ascertained from the court's opinion what the court determined in regard to respondent's contention that it was deprived of its opportunity to make an investigation of the insurability
of the deceased by the deceased's alleged fraudulent
application for reinstatement.
DATED this 17th day of June, 1970.
Don J. Hanson
HANSON & GARRETT
Attorneys for Defendant
and Respondent

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PE'TITION
FOR REHEARING
POINT I
IT CANNOT BE ASCERTAINED FROM THE
COURT'S OPINION WHAT THE COURT DETERMINED IN REGARD TO RESPONDENT'S
CONTENTION THAT IT WAS DEPRIVED OF
I'TS OPPORTUNI'TY TO MAKE AN INVESTIGATION OF THE INSURABILlTY OF THE DECEASED BY THE DECEASED'S ALLEGED
FRAUDULENT APPLICATION F 0 R REINSTATEMENT.

Defendant and respondent respectfully represents to the court that it cannot determine from the
court's opinion herein what disposition was made of
the defendant and respondent's contention that the
deceased deprived respondent of its opportunity to
make an investigation of the insurability of the deceased by his alleged false application. If we understand the court's opinion correctly, the court holds
that a reinstatement of an insurance contract is not,
in contemplation of law, a new contract but a continuation of the original policy. The respondent herein
has never claimed that reinstatement of an insurance
policy cons'titutes a new contract nor is it material to
the issues presented herein whether we consider the
reinstatement of an insurance policy to be a revival
of the old policy or to constitute a new contract. As
will be illustrated, most courts apply the same rule
of law to a reinstatement of the policy under either
theory.
2

What the respondent claims is that the failure
of the deceased, Dr. Preston Burnham, to disclose
that he had consulted a psychiatrist in a professional
capacity for a total of eighty visits deprived the respondent upon application for reinstatement of the
opportunity to require what evidence of insurability
it deemed to be satisfactory and to make a complete
investigation prior to the reinstatement. This court
held in its opinion that "Under the reinstatement
clause the insurer is accorded the right to require
whatever evidence of insurability i't determined satisfactory and a fair opportunity to make a complete
investigation prior to reinstatement," but did not, insofar as we are able to determine, state in its opinion
whether or not the respondent had been afforded
such an opportunity. The trial court held:
"Disclosure by the insured of the numerous visits to Dr. Fowler would have enabled
the insurer to evaluate what they might have
learned from Dr. Fowler bearing upon 'the option to insert again the two-year contestability
restriction in connection with death due to
suicide. It is the view of the court that Dr.
Burnham's failure 'to disclose prevented the
insurer from exercising its right to evaluate
what it might have learned from Dr. Fowler
and to apply the restriction to the reinstated
policy and that this failure to disclose was a
misrepresentation by omission and a fraud
upon the insurer."
It may be that the respondent, as stated by the
court, did not have the option of inserting the two3

year contestability restriction in connection with
death due to suicide back into the policy upon reinstatement but at least they could have refused to reinstate the policy.
What the court seems to have said in this case
but what we do not believe it intended is that if an
insured makes a false application for reinstatement
of a policy of insurance, the mere making of the application for reinstatement revives the old policy regardless of whether or not the information contained
in the application is correct or incorrect. In arriving
at this conclusion, the court relies upon the case of
Gressler v. New York Life Insurance Company, 108
Utah 173, 156 P. 2d 212 ( 1945), modified on rehearing 108 Utah 182, 163 P. 2d 324 (1945), 164 A.L.R.
1047. The court in that case did decide that under
Utah law a life insurance policy with a clause providing for reinstatement after lapse for nonpayment of
premiums upon presentation of evidence of insurabilty satisfactory to the insurer, is not entirely terminated upon default of the premium payment, for the
insured has a contractural right under the policy to
reinstate fully upon compliance with the conditions
for reinstatement contained in the policy, and that
"Furthermore, an application for reinstatement is
neither an offer to enter into a new contract of insitrance nor an offer to enter into a contract to reinstate
the old policy; rather it is the first step taken to comply with the conditions of reinstatement." (Emphasis added)
However, the court went on to say that the mere
4

filing of an application for reinstatement did not by
and in itself revive the policy. Quoting from the second case the court said:
"We cannot accept this view that when
the applicant filed the application to revive together with the necessary papers accompanying it, and 'there then existed no valid objection to the form or substance of such application, or papers or the proof furnished therewith' the Company could 'do but one thing, viz.,
revive the policy.' (Emphasis added.) The
condition for reviving the policy was not only
the presentation at the Home Office of evidence of insurability but such evidence 'satisfactory to the company.' This did ndt mean
that answers to questions submitted by the
Company which would show insuability must
be accepted by the Company, nor that the Company could not ask further questions. This
phrase 'satisfactory to the Company' implies
that the Company must have opportunity to
determine whether the evidence is satisfactory
to jt and that means an opportunity to conduct
an investigation to determine whether the answers were correct or whether the investigation disclosed further matters in regard to
which the Company may desire to interrogate
the applicant. Such was necessarily implied in
our original opinion which held that the insurer must have a reasonable time in which
to act. Indeed we do not understand that the
respondents contend to the contrary. They concluded, however, that the revision went into
effect automatically if the proof submitted
with the application on its face showed insurabili'ty subject to a defeasance if it was discovered that the answers were untrue. And it may
5

be that in the end the practical results in this
case will be the same."
The court further stated:
"The complaint sets up the policy, the
death, proof of death and refusal to pay. The
amended answer alleges 'that the policy expired on August 28, 1940, and sets up a defense
that the request for revival of the policy under
the reinstatment provision had not been accepted by defendant and that said policy was
not reinstated and further sets up the laws of
the States of ashington and New York as
applicable to the case, which laws were evidently construed by the Company to hold that
action by the insurer reinstating the policy was
necessary for reinstatement, the policy not being automatically reinstated. The reply denied
that the negotiations between Gressler and the
Company between August 22nd and 31st constituted an offer to reinstate but alleged that
they worked a reinstatement. Thus the issue
of law decided in this case was squarely presented to the trial court and in 'turn to this
court. We have decided in that regard that the
plaintiffs were in error on their conception of
the law and have also decided that the Company should have a reasonable time to satisfy
itself as to insurability, and that at the time
of Gressler's death it did not have such reasonable time. The question remains as to whether
the Company pursued after Gressler's death
its right to satisfy itself as to his insurability
within a reasonable time and if so whether it
uncovered matters from which a reasonable
insurer could determine whether Gressler's
evidence of insurability was satisfactory. The
complaint and reply proceeded on the theory

'¥
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that the policy had been reinstated and was
therefore in existence either because the conditions for reinstatement had been fulfilled or
because the Company by its conduct was estopped to deny the fact of reinstatement because
of such alleged conduct and representations.
We have decided that up to the date of death
the policy was not reinstated. We do not think
there has been litigated the issue as to whether
it was reinstated because of unreasonable delay after the death in acting or because nothing
was turned up by the Company if it pursued
an investigation which could be urged as a
basis that the evidence of insurability was not
satisfactory to it. \Ve think the judgment of
the trial court must be reversed but that our
instructions contained in the original opinion
must be withdrawn. Opportunity to amend the
pleadings to raise these issues must be given.
This is not exactly the case of where a defenden t might have pleaded a defense but failed
to clo so. In this case we have in respect to the
holding that the policy was automatically reinstated at the time the questionnaire was
mailed overruled the Parker case by which defendant had considered itself bound as the law
of this jurisdiction. It did so in attempting to
go around it by urging that the laws of Washington and New York applied. In this we held
against it, but we also held against the plaintiffs in their contentions that the policy was
automatically reinstated on August 31, 1970,
with right only in the insurer to show by evidence that the answers to the questions propounded were untrue and thus defeat the alleged reinstatement by what in effect is analogous to a condition subsequent."
7

This coutt in its opinion seems to proceed on the
theory that respondent is attempting to invoke the
suicide clause and holds that this may not be done
since by its express terms time is to be reckoned from
the date the policy was originally issued and not from
the date of reinstatement. Again, it has never been
contended by the respondent here in that coverage
should be denied under this policy by reason of the
suicide clause. In fact, had respondent so contended,
the $10,000 principal sum, which was in fact paid,
would have been contested. That clause within the
proper term could have been invoked or refused payment of either the principal sum or the amount provided for by the decreasing term rider. In arriving
at such conclusion, this court points out that Section
31-22-18 (2), Utah Code Annotated 1953, would not
apply to an insurance policy which was issued in
1962. The portion of Section 31-22-18 relied upon
was not subparagraph ( 2) but subparagraph ( 1)
which provides:
'"A reinstated policy of life insurance or
annuity contract may be contested on account
of fraud or misrepresentation of facts material to the reinstatement only for the same period following reinstatement and with the same
conditions and exceptions as the policy provides with respect to contestability after original issuance."
A reading of that section discloses that the section does not attempt to make a new contract for the
parties but simply refers back to the original policy,
which provides that the incontestability clause con8

tained in the original policy shall be applicable upon
reinstatement of the policy. The court assumes that
this provision was undoubtedly a legislative response
to a serious omission in the law which had previously
provided the policy shall be incontestable after it shall
have been in force during the lifetime of the insured
for a period of two years from its date, Section 3122-1 (3), Utah Code Annotated 1953. The section
cited simply referred to the required provisions and
contents of an insurance policy and not to the reinstatement of an insurance policy. Moreover, even
with such a provision in a policy, most of the nation's
courts have held that where a policy has been in force,
the contestability period of two years has run, the
policy then lapses and is reinstated by an application
for reinstatement, the con testability clause runs anew
from the date of reinstatement even though no statute
may be involved. In other words, contrary to the
court's view, Section 31-22-18 ( 1) is not a legislative
response to a serious omission in the law but rather
a codification of the law as it existed at the time the
code section was enacted.
The courts in the majority of jurisdictions have
reasoned that reinstatement either effects a new contract of insurance, the terms of which are determined
from the policy as originally issued, or renews the original contract in full with all of its terms. Consequently, the incontestability clause runs anew from
the date of reinstatement. The effect of this line of
reasoning is that the insurer may on grounds of fraud
9

or other material misrepresentation contest the policy as reinstated within the time limit as specified
in the incontestable clause of the policy as issued, and
following the expiration of such time is prohibited
from making further contest. Thus, in Lanier v.
New York Life Insitrance Company, 88 F. 2d 196,
(5th Cir. 1937), Cert. denied 301 U.S. 693, (1937),
where the incontestable clause agreement provided
that "This policy shall be incontestable after two
years from its date of issue except for non-paymen't
of premium," the court held that the insurer had two
years from the date of reinstatement to contest the
policy. In New York Life Insurance Company v.
Seymour, 45 F. 2d 47 (6th Cir. 1930), it was held
that a two-year incontestable clause in a life insurance policy though not specifically made applicable
in case of a reinstatement of the policy after a lapse
might fairly be construed as having taken fresh effect when the policy again came into force by a reinstatement; and that the right to contest because of
fraud in the reinstatement would expire two years
after the date of reinstatement. The court stated that
while this conclusion could not be predicated upon
any precise language in the policy, it was a reasonable inference as to what the parties intended by reinstating a policy containing an incontestable clause.
In ll1cCary v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company, 236 C.A 2d 501, 46 Cal. Reporter
121, 23 ALR 3rd 733 ( 1965), the incontestable clause
provided that a life insurance policy's supplementary
10

provision for family income should be incontestable
after it had been in force during the lifetime of the
insured for two years from the date of issue except
for non-payment of premiums. An application for
reinstatement of the policy was filled out after two
years from the date of issue and contained a false
representation by the insured as to his health. The insured died three months later, and it was contended
by the beneficiary that the two-year limitation period in the clause barred the insurer after the expiration of the period from contesting the truthfulness
of the insured's representations in the application for
reinstatement. The court held that the insurer was
not barred by the incontestable clause from defending against the reinstatement which it allowed in reliance upon the insured's representations.
Other courts have held that reinstatement is a
contract to reinstate or revive the contract of insurance as issued, but that the incontestable clause becomes no part of the contract for reinstatement. As
a resul't under such decisions, the insurer may contest
the contract to reinstate upon grounds of fraud or
the like at any time without reference to the incontestable clause in the policy as issued. The contract
for the restoration of the policy like any other contract may be attacked at any time for fraud or other
material misrepresentation in procurement without
reference to the incontestable clause in the original
policy.
In McMahon v. Continental Assurance Com11

pany, 308 Ill. App. 27, 30 N.E. 2d 959 (1940), the policy contained provisions for reinstatement at any
time within its term upon written application accompanied by evidence of insurability satisfactory to the
insurer. The policy also contained a clause to 'the effect that the policy should be incontestable after two
years from its date of execution except for nonpayment of premiums. The court in that case held that
although the policy had been in force for more than
two years when it lapsed for nonpayment of premiums, the insurer could urge as a defense to a recovery by the beneficiary that the reinstatement of
the policy after it had lapesd was procured through
fraudulent representations in the application for reinstatement, such a defense not constituting a contest
or attack on the original policy but upon contract for
the reinstatement thereof. The court further said
that inasmuch as the insurer was induced to reinstate the policy of insurance as a result of the fraud
of the insured, the policy was never in fact or law
reinstated and that it necessarily followed that the
situation was the same as if no contract for reinstatement was ever entered into.
In Acacia Mutual Life Association v. Kaul, 114
NJE 491, 169 A. 36 (1933), neither the original policy nor the contract of reinstatement contained any
provision limiting attack upon 'the reinstatement to
the contestable period fixed in the policy. The court
said that the reinstatement of the policy was neither
the issuance of a new policy nor the reissuance of the
12

original policy but merely a waiver of the lapse of the
original policy and the reinstatement thereof in full
force, including the incontestable clause. The court
held that the reinstatement could be attacked for
fraudulent procurement notwithstanding the expiration of the limitation period of the incontestable
clause in the original contract. The court noted that
no contest could be made as to fraudulent misrepresentations in the original issuance of the policy since
the one-year period of contestability had expired.
There is admittedly a third view, which is that
once the incontestable clause of a policy as issued has
become effective to bar the insurer from contesting
the policy, the insurer is additionally barred from
contesting the policy as reinstated. Accordingly, in
reinstating a policy, the insurer acts at llis peril. In
view of the court's decision in Gressler v. New York
Life Insurance Company, supra, this would not appear to be the holding in the state of Utah.
A case particularly in point having to do with
the statute involved is a Florida case, Occidental Life
Insurance Company v. Sobieski, 359 F. 2d 382, (5th
Cir. Fla. 1966). In that case it was held that prior
law to the effect that as to fraud in the procurement
of the reinstatement, the contestable period began to
run anew as of the date of the reinstatement, governed disposition of the case, unless a recently enacted
statute provided differently. The statute provided
that a reinstatement policy might be contested on account of fraud or misrepresentation of facts material
13

to the reinstatement only for the same period following re-instatement and with the same conditions and
exceptions as the policy provided with respect to contestability after original issuance. Although it was
decided that the statute was inapplicable in that the
policy was issued before enactment of the statute, the
court discussed the statute to some extent. The beneficiary contended that the statute required the insured to stipulate by a policy provision that it might contest the validity of a reinstatement within the designated period if it was to have such a right. The court
stated that the statute was no't one requiring the inclusion of a policy provision, but it supplied the applicable clause and it operated in the absence of an
express policy provision. Noting that it incorporated
as a statutory rule that which former case law required to be inferred as being intended by the parties,
the court stated that there was nothing in the statute
to indicate any requirement that the right to contest
a requirement must be reserved in the policy, and, on
the contrary, the statutory intent was clear as to the
existence of such right in the absence of a policy provision. The court concluded 'that the statute accordingly merely reiterated prior case law.
It is respectfully suggested that this court did

not intended to overrule the case of Gressler v. New
York Life Insurance Company, supra, and to deprive
insurers of their right to investigate 'the insurability
of an applicant for insurance upon reinstatement of
a policy, a conclusion which some may infer from the
14

decision and which we are sure the appellant will attempt to infer in this case. If such was the intent of
'the court, we respectfully urge that they not adopt
a rule which would immediately revive the policy upon the mere filing of an application for reinstatement regardless of whether or not the applicant were
guilty of 'fraud in the procurement of the reinstatement. It is further urged that the court grant a rehearing for the purpose of either clarifying or modifying its decision herein and dealing directly with
this issue.
Respectfully submitted,
HANSON & GARRETT
DON J. HANSON
520 Continental Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Respondent
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